Divide or confer: Aggregating information without verification
2025-05-20 12:45 - 14:00 (Europe/Helsinki) | 15.1.39
James Best
(Carnegie Mellon University)

“Divide or confer: Aggregating information without verification”

Face-to-face Seminar – Room 15.1.39

Mediated repeated moral hazard
2025-06-17 12:45 - 14:00
Allen Vong
(National University of Singapore)

“Mediated repeated moral hazard”

Room 15.1.39

Random Choice and Differentiation
2025-06-25 12:45 - 14:00
Paulo Natenzon
(Washington University in St. Louis))

“Random Choice and Differentiation”

Room 15.1.39

Games with Imperfectly Attributable Actions
2025-09-16 12:45 - 14:00
David Rahman
(University of Minnesota)

“Games with Imperfectly Attributable Actions”

Face-to-face Seminar – Room 15.1.39

Robust Delegation
2025-09-23 12:45 - 14:00
Tan Gan
(London School of Economics)

“Robust Delegation”

Face-to-face Seminar – Room 15.1.39

Disclosure by groups, joint with Joao Ramos
2025-10-07 12:45 - 14:00
Paula Onuchic
(London School of Economics)

“Disclosure by groups, joint with Joao Ramos”

Face-to-face Seminar – Room 15.1.39

TBA
2025-10-08 12:45 - 14:00
Hugo Hopenhayn
(UCLA)

“TBA”

Room 15.1.39

Hidden Hostility, Donor Attention and Political Violence" (joint with Siwan Anderson, Patrick Francois and Rogerio Santarrosa)
2025-10-21 12:45 - 14:00
Dominic Rohner
(Geneva Graduate Institute)

“Hidden Hostility, Donor Attention and Political Violence” (joint with Siwan Anderson, Patrick Francois and Rogerio Santarrosa)”

Room 15.1.39

Q-Learning and Algorithmic Market Making: Loss-free, Collusive, or Competitive Prices?
2025-10-28 12:45 - 14:00
Antonio Guarino
(University College London)

“Q-Learning and Algorithmic Market Making: Loss-free, Collusive, or Competitive Prices?”

Face-to-face Seminar – Room 15.1.39

An Order-Statistics Approach to Information Aggregation in Organizations and Voting
2025-11-04 12:45 - 14:00
Peter Norman Sorensen
(University of Copenhagen)

“An Order-Statistics Approach to Information Aggregation in Organizations and Voting”

Face-to-face Seminar – Room 15.1.39

Selling with Network Flows: A New Approach to Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanisms (together with Ali Shourideh)
2025-11-07 12:45 - 14:00
Alexey Kushnir
(Moroccan Center for Game Theory)

“Selling with Network Flows: A New Approach to Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanisms (together with Ali Shourideh)”

Room 15.1.39

The Economics of Large Language Models: Token Allocation, Fine-Tuning, and Optimal Pricing
2025-11-11 12:45 - 14:00
Alex Smolin
(Toulouse School of Economics)

“The Economics of Large Language Models: Token Allocation, Fine-Tuning, and Optimal Pricing”

Face-to-face Seminar – Room 15.1.39

Optimal Disclosure of Private Information to Competitors
2026-03-03 12:45 - 14:00
Rosina Rodríguez Olivera
(U. Montevideo)

“Optimal Disclosure of Private Information to Competitors”

Face-to-face Seminar 15.2.71 – Room 15.1.39

Optimal Allowance with Limited Auditing Capacity
2026-03-10 12:45 - 14:00
Albin Erlanson
(University of Essex )

“Optimal Allowance with Limited Auditing Capacity”

Face-to-face Seminar – Room 15.1.39

Stochastic Optimization and Coupling
2026-03-17 12:45 - 14:00
Kai Hao Yang
(Yale School of Management)

“Stochastic Optimization and Coupling”

Face-to-face Seminar 15.2.36 – Room Seminar 15.1.39

When and how to rescue efficiencies from oblivion in horizontal merger control?
2026-04-07 12:45 - 14:00
Jorge Padilla
(Compass Lexecon)

“When and how to rescue efficiencies from oblivion in horizontal merger control?”

Face-to-face Seminar 15.2.71 – Room 15.1.39

Strategyproof Maximum Matching Under Dichotomous Agent Preferences," joint work with Haris Aziz and Shahidul Islam
2026-04-14 12:45 - 14:00
Szilvia Papai
(Concordia University)

“Strategyproof Maximum Matching Under Dichotomous Agent Preferences,” joint work with Haris Aziz and Shahidul Islam”

Face-to-face Seminar 15.2.71 – Room 15.1.39

Price Discrimination and Market Power in Insurance Markets
2026-04-21 12:45 - 14:00
Christopher Sandmann
(LSE)

“Price Discrimination and Market Power in Insurance Markets”

Face-to-face Seminar 15.2.71 – Room 15.1.39

Demographic Decline and Within School Segregation (with Claudia Meo, Pietro Salmaso and Duygu Sili)
2026-04-28 12:45 - 14:00
Antonio Miralles
(Università degli Studi di Messina)

“Demographic Decline and Within School Segregation (with Claudia Meo, Pietro Salmaso and Duygu Sili)”

Face-to-face Seminar 15.2.71 – Room 15.1.39

Convex Choice
2026-05-05 00:45 - 14:00
Andy Kleiner
(University of Bonn)

“Convex Choice”

Face to Face 15.2.71 – Room 15.1.39

Social Learning with Endogenous Timing (joint with Daniel Hauser and Pauli Murto)
2026-05-12 12:45 - 14:00
Juuso Valimaki
(Aalto University School of Business)

“Social Learning with Endogenous Timing (joint with Daniel Hauser and Pauli Murto)”

Face to Face 15.2.71 – Room 15.1.39

The War of Attrition under Uncertainty: Theory and Robust Testable Implications » with Jean-Paul Décamps and Fabien Gensbittel
2026-05-19 12:45 - 14:00
Thomas Mariotti
(TSE)

“The War of Attrition under Uncertainty: Theory and Robust Testable Implications » with Jean-Paul Décamps and Fabien Gensbittel”

Face-to-face Seminar 15.2.71 – Room Seminar 15.1.39

Success, Learning, and Overconfidence in Elimination Contests
2026-05-26 12:45 - 14:00
Luis Santos-Pinto
(University of Lausanne )

“Success, Learning, and Overconfidence in Elimination Contests”

Face to Face 15.2.71 – Room 15.1.39

Pure backward induction reasoning in dynamic games
2026-06-03 11:00 - 12:30
Andrés Perea
(Maastricht University)

“Pure backward induction reasoning in dynamic games”

Face to Face 15.2.36 – Room 15.1.39

Testing or selling? Market entry under uncertainty, paper joint with Chantal Marlats (Université de Tours)
2026-06-09 12:45 - 14:00
Lucie Ménager
(Université Paris Panthéon-Assas)

“Testing or selling? Market entry under uncertainty, paper joint with Chantal Marlats (Université de Tours)”

Face to Face 15.2.71 – Room Seminar 15.1.39

Speed, Accuracy, and Complexity
2026-06-16 12:45 - 14:00
Duarte Gonçalves
(University College London)

“Speed, Accuracy, and Complexity”

Face to Face 15.2.71 – Room Seminar 15.1.39

Networks and Norms (joint with Matteo Marsili, Intentional Center of Theoretical Physics, Trieste)
2026-07-23 00:45 - 14:00
Fernando Vega-Redondo
(Chinese University of Hong Kong)

“Networks and Norms (joint with Matteo Marsili, Intentional Center of Theoretical Physics, Trieste)”
ABSTRACT: The co-evolution of social networks and social norms gives rise to a wide range of dynamic behavior. For, as our model highlights, networks not only support the rise of new norms but also tend to block significant changes in established ones. This is why history often shows that, before prevailing norms can be dislodged, incumbent networks must erode. Over time, therefore, the evolution of norms tends to display long phases of slow change, sporadically punctuated by short periods of fast network adjustment in which new norms arise and then gain a robust foothold. Our theoretical framework, by accommodating different time scales, sheds light of how such a rise and fall of norms and networks unfold.

Room 15.1.39

TBA
2026-09-15 12:45 - 14:00
Mikael Mäkimattila
(Aalto University)

“TBA”

Face to Face 15.2.71 – Room 15.1.39

Collusion without Patience
2026-09-22 12:45 - 14:00
Toomas Hinnosaar
(University of Nottingham)

“Collusion without Patience”
Abstract: Tacit collusion is usually linked to repeated interactions between patient firms. We show that it can also arise in a one-shot duopoly. When firms choose capacities and face outsourcing contracts with minimum order quantities, gaps in feasible outputs allow commitment not to sell intermediate quantities. For a range of parameters, there exists a collusive equilibrium in which both firms produce less and earn more than under competition. Three other equilibria can also arise: competitive, leadership, and miscoordination. We then extend the model to general two-sided limited commitment and show that it yields the same set of equilibria.
Face to Face 15.2.71 – Room 15.1.39

Socially optimal rating design
2026-09-29 12:45 - 14:00
Helene Mass
(University of Vienna)

“Socially optimal rating design”

Face to Face 15.2.71 – Room Seminar 15.1.39
