The War of Attrition under Uncertainty: Theory and Robust Testable Implications » with Jean-Paul Décamps and Fabien Gensbittel
2026-05-19 12:45 - 14:00 (Europe/Helsinki) | 15.1.39
Thomas Mariotti
(TSE)

“The War of Attrition under Uncertainty: Theory and Robust Testable Implications » with Jean-Paul Décamps and Fabien Gensbittel”

Face-to-face Seminar 15.2.71 – Room Seminar 15.1.39

Success, Learning, and Overconfidence in Elimination Contests
2026-05-26 12:45 - 14:00
Luis Santos-Pinto
(University of Lausanne )

“Success, Learning, and Overconfidence in Elimination Contests”

Face to Face 15.2.71 – Room 15.1.39

Pure backward induction reasoning in dynamic games
2026-06-03 11:00 - 12:30
Andrés Perea
(Maastricht University)

“Pure backward induction reasoning in dynamic games”

Face to Face 15.2.36 – Room 15.1.39

Testing or selling? Market entry under uncertainty, paper joint with Chantal Marlats (Université de Tours)
2026-06-09 12:45 - 14:00
Lucie Ménager
(Université Paris Panthéon-Assas)

“Testing or selling? Market entry under uncertainty, paper joint with Chantal Marlats (Université de Tours)”

Face to Face 15.2.71 – Room Seminar 15.1.39

Speed, Accuracy, and Complexity
2026-06-16 12:45 - 14:00
Duarte Gonçalves
(University College London)

“Speed, Accuracy, and Complexity”

Face to Face 15.2.71 – Room Seminar 15.1.39

Networks and Norms (joint with Matteo Marsili, Intentional Center of Theoretical Physics, Trieste)
2026-07-23 00:45 - 14:00
Fernando Vega-Redondo
(Chinese University of Hong Kong)

“Networks and Norms (joint with Matteo Marsili, Intentional Center of Theoretical Physics, Trieste)”
ABSTRACT: The co-evolution of social networks and social norms gives rise to a wide range of dynamic behavior. For, as our model highlights, networks not only support the rise of new norms but also tend to block significant changes in established ones. This is why history often shows that, before prevailing norms can be dislodged, incumbent networks must erode. Over time, therefore, the evolution of norms tends to display long phases of slow change, sporadically punctuated by short periods of fast network adjustment in which new norms arise and then gain a robust foothold. Our theoretical framework, by accommodating different time scales, sheds light of how such a rise and fall of norms and networks unfold.

Room 15.1.39

TBA
2026-09-15 12:45 - 14:00
Mikael Mäkimattila
(Aalto University)

“TBA”

Face to Face 15.2.71 – Room 15.1.39

Collusion without Patience
2026-09-22 12:45 - 14:00
Toomas Hinnosaar
(University of Nottingham)

“Collusion without Patience”
Abstract: Tacit collusion is usually linked to repeated interactions between patient firms. We show that it can also arise in a one-shot duopoly. When firms choose capacities and face outsourcing contracts with minimum order quantities, gaps in feasible outputs allow commitment not to sell intermediate quantities. For a range of parameters, there exists a collusive equilibrium in which both firms produce less and earn more than under competition. Three other equilibria can also arise: competitive, leadership, and miscoordination. We then extend the model to general two-sided limited commitment and show that it yields the same set of equilibria.
Face to Face 15.2.71 – Room 15.1.39

TBA
2026-09-29 12:45 - 14:00
Helene Mass
(University of Vienna)

“TBA”

Face to Face 15.2.71 – Room Seminar 15.1.39
