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X-WR-CALNAME:Department of Economics Universidad Carlos III
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X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Department of Economics Universidad Carlos III
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20260922T124500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20260922T140000
DTSTAMP:20260713T123017Z
CREATED:20260713T123017Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260713T123017Z
UID:10605-1790081100-1790085600@economics.uc3m.es
SUMMARY:Collusion without Patience
DESCRIPTION:Toomas Hinnosaar\n(University of Nottingham)\n  \n“Collusion without Patience”\nAbstract: Tacit collusion is usually linked to repeated interactions between patient firms. We show that it can also arise in a one-shot duopoly. When firms choose capacities and face outsourcing contracts with minimum order quantities\, gaps in feasible outputs allow commitment not to sell intermediate quantities. For a range of parameters\, there exists a collusive equilibrium in which both firms produce less and earn more than under competition. Three other equilibria can also arise: competitive\, leadership\, and miscoordination. We then extend the model to general two-sided limited commitment and show that it yields the same set of equilibria. \nFace to Face 15.2.71  –  Room 15.1.39
URL:https://economics.uc3m.es/event/collusion-without-patience/
LOCATION:15.1.39
CATEGORIES:Microeconomics Seminar
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://economics.uc3m.es/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/images-e1783945610841.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20260929T124500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20260929T140000
DTSTAMP:20260728T083838Z
CREATED:20260714T091142Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260728T083838Z
UID:10624-1790685900-1790690400@economics.uc3m.es
SUMMARY:Socially optimal rating design
DESCRIPTION:Helene Mass\n(University of Vienna)\n  \n“Socially optimal rating design”\n  \nFace to Face 15.2.71  –  Room Seminar 15.1.39
URL:https://economics.uc3m.es/event/tba-198/
LOCATION:15.1.39
CATEGORIES:Microeconomics Seminar
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://economics.uc3m.es/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/unnamed-3-e1784020143225.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20261013T124500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20261013T140000
DTSTAMP:20260910T150435Z
CREATED:20260910T150435Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260910T150435Z
UID:10741-1791895500-1791900000@economics.uc3m.es
SUMMARY:TBA
DESCRIPTION:Deniz Kattwinkel\n(University College London)\n  \n“TBA”\n  \nFace to Face 15.2.71  –  Room 15.1.39
URL:https://economics.uc3m.es/event/tba-206/
LOCATION:15.1.39
CATEGORIES:Microeconomics Seminar
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://economics.uc3m.es/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/1616250922500-e1789052526767.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20261020T004500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20261020T140000
DTSTAMP:20260806T090528Z
CREATED:20260806T090528Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260806T090528Z
UID:10687-1792457100-1792504800@economics.uc3m.es
SUMMARY:On the Inefficiency of Social Learning
DESCRIPTION:Florian Brandl\n(University of Bonn)\n  \n“On the Inefficiency of Social Learning“\nAbstract: We study whether a social planner can restore efficient learning a finite expected number of incorrect actions in the canonical sequential social learning model. Agents act in order\, each choosing one of two actions based on a private signal and the social information they observe. The planner controls the social information disclosed to each agent and offers transfers contingent on the agent’s action. We show that whenever learning is inefficient without intervention\, no combination of disclosure and transfers restores efficient learning at finite cost: the planner must offer subsidies approaching the full value of a correct decision to infinitely many agents\, so the expected total offered transfer is infinite. In particular\, no disclosure policy alone restores efficiency. Offered transfers\, however\, differ from realized payments: since a transfer is paid only when the agent takes the subsidized action\, the planner can achieve efficient learning while keeping the expected total realized payment arbitrarily small.\n  \n Face to Face 15.2.71  – Room 15.1.39
URL:https://economics.uc3m.es/event/on-the-inefficiency-of-social-learning/
LOCATION:15.1.39
CATEGORIES:Microeconomics Seminar
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://economics.uc3m.es/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/descarga-e1786007067398.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20261027T124500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20261027T140000
DTSTAMP:20260806T091646Z
CREATED:20260806T091646Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260806T091646Z
UID:10694-1793105100-1793109600@economics.uc3m.es
SUMMARY:TBA
DESCRIPTION:Martin Vaeth\n(Paris School of Economics)\n  \n“TBA”\n  \nFace to Face 15.2.71  –  Room Seminar 15.1.39
URL:https://economics.uc3m.es/event/tba-204/
LOCATION:15.1.39
CATEGORIES:Microeconomics Seminar
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://economics.uc3m.es/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/unnamed-e1786007699952.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20261103T124500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20261103T140000
DTSTAMP:20260915T085806Z
CREATED:20260915T085806Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260915T085806Z
UID:10759-1793709900-1793714400@economics.uc3m.es
SUMMARY:TBA
DESCRIPTION:Hector Chade\n(Arizona State University)\n  \n“TBA”\n  \nFace to Face 15.2.71  –  Room Seminar 15.1.39
URL:https://economics.uc3m.es/event/tba-207/
LOCATION:15.1.39
CATEGORIES:Microeconomics Seminar
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://economics.uc3m.es/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/images-e1789462184445.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20261110T124500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20261110T140000
DTSTAMP:20260915T075818Z
CREATED:20260915T075818Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260915T075818Z
UID:10749-1794314700-1794319200@economics.uc3m.es
SUMMARY:Inference from Outcomes in the Market for Lemons
DESCRIPTION:Nenad Kos\n(University Bocconi)\n  \n“Inference from Outcomes in the Market for Lemons”\nAbstract: This paper studies inference from equilibrium outcomes in a market for lemons. The model is a posted-price adverse-selection environment: a monopsonist offers a price to a continuum of sellers\, each of whom privately observes the quality of her good\, which affects the buyer’s value\, and decides whether to trade. We ask what an analyst who knows players’ preferences can infer about the latent quality distribution\, surplus\, and welfare from observing an equilibrium price and\, possibly\, the quantity traded. The key observation is that the price is a revealed choice: if the buyer optimally posted the observed price\, then every alternative price must have yielded weakly lower payoff\, generating equilibrium inequalities that restrict the unobserved distribution. We characterize the boundaries of the set of distributions consistent with a price–quantity pair\, or with a price alone\, through extremal distributions obtained from binding optimality constraints. These bounds imply sharp ranges for producer surplus\, consumer surplus\, total welfare\, and deadweight loss. The analysis shows that sparse market data can have nontrivial welfare content once the equilibrium logic of the lemons model is imposed. In the private-values benchmark\, the problem reduces to standard monopoly pricing and admits a simple stochastic-dominance characterization. \n\nFace to Face 15.2.71  –  Room 15.1.39
URL:https://economics.uc3m.es/event/inference-from-outcomes-in-the-market-for-lemons/
LOCATION:15.1.39
CATEGORIES:Microeconomics Seminar
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://economics.uc3m.es/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/unnamed-e1789458877586.jpg
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