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Commitment and randomization in communication
Commitment and randomization in communication
Emir Kamenica (Chicago Booth School of Business) "Commitment and randomization in communication" Face-to-face Seminar - Room 15.1.39
Emir Kamenica (Chicago Booth School of Business) "Commitment and randomization in communication" Face-to-face Seminar - Room 15.1.39
Daniel Monte (U. Torino) "Equilibrium Trade Regimes: Power- vs. Rules-Based" (joint with C. Carvalho and E. Ornelas)" Face-to-face Seminar - Room 15.1.39
Wolfgang Pesendorfer (Princeton University) "Lindahl Equilibrium as a Collective Choice Rule (joint with Faruk Gul)" Room 15.1.39
James Best (Carnegie Mellon University) "Divide or confer: Aggregating information without verification" Face-to-face Seminar - Room 15.1.39
Navin Kartik (Columbia University) "Replacement and Reputation" Face-to-face Seminar - Room 15.1.39