• R&D Investments Fostering Horizontal Mergers (with C. Cabolis, C. Manasakis, and E. Petrakis), Universidad Carlos III de Madrid Working Paper 16-09. (Full text)
• The Non-Neutrality of the Arm’s Length Principle with Imperfect Competition (with A. B. Lemus), Universidad Carlos III de Madrid Working Paper 18-06. (Full text)
• Continuity and Robustness of Bayesian Equilibria in Tullock Contests (with E. Ein and A. Sela), Universidad Carlos III de Madrid Working Paper 19-094. (Full text)
Published Papers
• Information in Tullock Contests (with A. Aiche, E. Einy, O. Haimanko, A. Sela and B. Shitovitz), Theory and Decision, forthcoming. (Full text)
• Tullock Contests Reward Information Advantages (with A. Aiche, E. Einy, O. Haimanko, A. Sela and B. Shitovitz),Economics Letters (2018) 172: 34-36. (Full text)
• The Value of Public Information in Common Value Tullock Contests (with E. Einy and B. Shitovitz), Economic Theory (2017) 63: 925-942. (Full Text)
• Reserve Prices in Auctions with Entry when the Seller is Risk Averse (with John Wooders), Economics Letters (2017) 154: 6-9. (Full text)
• Price Cap Regulation with Capacity Precommitment (con A. B. Lemus), International Journal of Industrial Organization(2017) 50: 131–158. (Full text)
• Optimal bank transparency (with Tuomas Takalo), Journal of Money, Credit and Banking (2016) 48, 203-231. (Full text)
• Dynamic Markets for Lemons: Performance, Liquidity, and Policy Intervention (with John Wooders), Theoretical Economics (2016) 11, 601-639. (Full text)
• Equilibrium Existence in Tullock Contests with Incomplete Information (with E. Einy, O. Haimanko, A. Sela and B. Shitovitz), Journal of Mathematical Economics (2015) 61: 241-245. (Full text)
• Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods (with María José Moscoso), Economic Theory(2013) 52: 315-336. (Full text)
• Auctions with heterogeneous entry costs (with John Wooders), RAND Journal of Economics, (2011) 42: 313–336. (Full text)
• On the existence of Bayesian Cournot equilibrium (with E. Einy, O. Haimanko and B. Shitovitz), Games and Economic Behavior (2010) 68: 77-94. (Full text)
• Decentralized trade mitigates the lemons problem (with J. Wooders), International Economic Review (2010) 51: 383-399.(Full text. The companion working paper: UC3M-wp2007-12)
• Uniform continuity of the value for zero-sum games with differential information (with E. Einy, O. Haimanko and B. Shitovitz), Mathematics of Operations Research (2008) 33: 552-560. (Full text)
• Capacity precommitment and price competition yield Cournot outcomes (with L. Ubeda), Games and Economic Behavior(2006) 56: 323-332. (Full text)
• On the continuity of equilibrium and core correspondences in economies with differential information (with E. Einy, O. Haimanko, and B. Shitovitz), Economic Theory (2005) 26: 793 – 812. (Full text)
• Coalition-proof supply function equilibria in oligopoly (with J. Delgado), Journal of Economic Theory (2004) 114: 231-254. (Full text)
• The value of public information in Cournot oligopoly (with E. Einy and B. Shitovitz), Games and Economic Behavior(2003) 44: 272-285. (Full text)
• Information advantage in Cournot oligopoly (with E. Einy and B. Shitovitz), Journal of Economic Theory (2002) 106: 151-160. (Full text)
• Prices, delay and the dynamics of trade (with J. Wooders), Journal of Economic Theory (2002) 104: 304-339. (Full text.)
• The bargaining set of a large exchange economy with differential information (with E. Einy and B. Shitovitz), Economic Theory (2001) 18: 473-484. (Full text)
• Competitive and core allocations in large economies with differential information (with E. Einy and B. Shitovitz),Economic Theory (2001) 18: 321-332. (Full text)
• On the core of an economy with differential information (with E. Einy and B. Shitovitz), Journal of Economic Theory(2000) 94: 262-270. (Full text)
• Rational expectations equilibria and the ex-post core of an economy with asymmetric information (with E. Einy and B. Shitovitz), Journal of Mathematical Economics (2000), 34: 527-535. (Full text)
• Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for pure public goods economies when preferences are monotonic, Economic Theory (1999) 13: 183-197. (Full text)
• The asymptotic nucleolus of large monopolistic market games (with E. Einy and B. Shitovitz), Journal of Economic Theory (1999), 89: 186-206. (Full text)
• The core of a class of non-atomic games which arise in economic applications (with E. Einy and B. Shitovitz),International Journal of Game Theory (1999) 28: 1-14. (Full text)
• The least core, kernel, and bargaining sets of large games (with E. Einy and D. Monderer), Economic Theory (1998) 11: 585-602. (Full text)
• An experimental study of communication and cooperation in noncooperative games (with J. Wooders), Games and Economic Behavior (1998) 24: 47-76. (Full text)
• Coalition-proof equilibrium (with J. Wooders), Games and Economic Behavior (1996) 17: 80-112.
(Full text)
• Convergence theorems for a class of recursive stochastic algorithms (with M. Walker). In J. Ledyard (Ed.): The Economics of Informational Decentralization: Complexity, Efficiency and Stability; Kluwer Academic Publisher, Amsterdam, 1995. ( Full text)
• Two problems in applying Ljung’s `projection algorithms’ to the analysis of decentralized learning (with M. Walker),Journal of Economic Theory (1994) 62: 420-427. (Full text)
• Nonmanipulable decision mechanisms for economic environments, Social Choice and Welfare (1994) 11: 225-240. (Full text)
• Nonmanipulable voting schemes when participants’ interests are partially decomposable (with M. Walker), Social Choice and Welfare (1991) 8: 221-233. (Full text)