Marco Celentani
Associate Professor
Game Theory, Reputation, Law, Contract Theory, Corporate Governance, Political Economy
+34 91 624 9546 Office: 15.2.37
marco.celentani@uc3m.es
Bio
Marco Celentani, has a Ph.D. in Economics from University of California, Los Angeles. He joined Universidad Carlos III in 1992. His current research is on economic voting, the dynamics of trust, debtor protection, legal aid, and executive compensation.
Currently he is the Director of P.hD. School.
Selected Publications
Celentani, M., Conde-Ruiz J.I., and Desmet K. “Inflation in open economies with complete markets” , Economic Theory, 2007, 31, 271-291.
Celentani, M., and Loveira, R. “A simple explanation of the relative performance evaluation puzzle”. Review of Economic Dynamics, 2006, 9, 525-540.
Celentani, M., Conde-Ruiz J.I., and Desmet K. “Endogenous fiscal policy leads to inefficient risk sharing” Review of Economic Dynamics, 2004, 7, 758-787.
Celentani, M., and Ganuza, J. “Competition and corruption in procurement” European Economic Review, 46, 1273-1303, 2002.
Celentani, M., and Pesendorfer, W. “Reputation in dynamic games” Journal of Economic Theory, 1996, 70(1), 109-132.
Celentani, M., Fudenber, D., Levine, D.K., and Pesendorfer, W. “Maintaining a reputation against a patient opponent” Econometrica, 1996, 64(3), pp. 691-704.
Recent Research
Celentani, M. “The Case for Legal Aid”.
Celentani, M., and Ganuza, J. "Understanding the Dynamics of Trust" (with Juan-José Ganuza), mimeo.
Celentani, M., and Conde-Ruiz J.I. “Politicians Career Concerns with Political Uncertainty" (with José-Ignacio Conde-Ruiz), mimeo.
Docencia
Microeconomic Theory (Undergraduate). Microeconomics I (Master in Economics and Master in Industrial Economics and Markets).