Diego Moreno

Bio

Diego Moreno, Ph.D. in Economics from the State University of New York at Stony Brook (1990), is a professor of economics at the uc3m since 2000. His research and teaching topics relate to microeconomics, game theory, the economics of information and industrial organization.

Selected Publications

General Equilibrium, Welfare and Policy Analysis when Firms Have Market Power (with Emmanuel Petrakis), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (2026), 107531.

Optimal Bank Transparency (with Tuomas Takalo), Journal of Money, Credit and Banking (2016) 48: 203-231.

Auctions with heterogeneous entry costs (with John Wooders), RAND Journal of Economics (2011) 42: 313-336.

Capacity precommitment and Price Competition yield Cournot outcomes (with Luis Úbeda), Games and Economic Behavior (2006) 556: 323-332.

Information Advantage in Cournot Oligopoly (with Ezra Einy and Benyamin Shitovitz), Journal of Economic Theory (2002) 106: 151-160.

Competitive and Core Allocations in Large Economies with Differential Information (with Ezra Einy y Benyamin Shitovitz), Economic Theory (2001) 18: 321-332.

Coalition-proof equilibrium (with John Wooders) Games and Economic Behavior (1996) 17: 80-112.

Two problems in applying Ljung's `projection algorithms' to the analysis of decentralized learning (with Mark Walker), Journal of Economic Theory (1994) 62: 420-427.